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Pourquoi, sous Stalin, la tentative d’augmenter la productivité agricole s’est-elle




Translated from German by Bill Templer
1 The Marxists harboured great expectations of a revolutionising of agricultural productive
forces in the transition to a “Socialist” agriculture, which in their conception would be
characterized by large‑scale enterprises.1 The external prerequisites for a rapid increase
in hectare yields and a lasting improvement in the output of Soviet agriculture were very
good at the end of the 1920s. The Russian experts by then had come to play a leading role
in international agrarian research. They had investigated the regional peculiarities of
farming in Russia and were in a good position to draft sweeping programmes for agrarian
reform.2 Economic  planning  promised  to  translate  new agricultural  knowledge  more
rapidly into production, thus facilitating a substantial rise in hectare yields and animal
performance.3 Small‑scale production was still  predominant and displayed a range of
serious defects, including strip positioning, numerous border furrows, remoteness of land
under cultivation,  strip farming (cherespolositsa),  primitive technology and a lack of
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adequate knowledge among the producers. The prospect of overcoming these weaknesses
promised significant growth in yields, and this also was in evidence in the second half of
the 1920s.4
2 This paper seeks to examine why a country with such excellent agronomists in the 1930s
did not prove able to implement much of their knowledge in practice in a bid to achieve
the rapid rise in per hectare yields which policy desired. The focus here is principally on
the measures which had been introduced and pursued with notable success since the 1906
Stolypin  agrarian  reform:  land  consolidation,  the  introduction  of  progressive  crop
rotation and the use of a selected seeds. Until now research had paid little attention to
the fact that the regime under Stalin continued with these measures and consistently
accorded them great importance. Just in the 1930s alone, four large‑scale campaigns were
launched to implement them. Why then did they fail? What informal institutions acted to
prevent the agricultural producers, those in responsible positions in the kolkhozes and in
the  local  party  and  Soviet  state  bureaucracy,  from  introducing  the  necessary  crop
rotations? Why did the agricultural producers under Stalin lose interest to such a marked
degree in increasing their yields? The investigation of these questions sheds revealing
light on the contradictory nature of Stalin’s agrarian policy. It highlights the specific
structure of this policy and its long‑term consequences. The increase in yield per hectare
and in animal performance remained comparatively modest in the Soviet Union even
after Stalin’s death. Poor harvests under Brezhnev would shake the regime anew.5 
3 The present essay addresses first the question as to whether agriculture under Stalin can
be  termed  “industrialised  agrarian  production,”  as  it  is  sometimes  called  in  the
contemporary literature on development policy (section 1).  Then it deals in a strictly
chronological  way  with  the  reaction  of  the  regime  in  the  1930s  to  catastrophes  in
agriculture it had itself created: the loss of control over the soil by forced collectivisation
(section 2); the neglect of agricultural technology causing weed infestation in the fields
and decreasing yields (section 3); the total neglect of crop rotations in the agricultural
enterprises and the blocking of the transition to useful crop rotations by linking the
obligatory delivery of grain to the land sown (section 4); the extensive loss in selected
seeds undermining the “life in prosperity” that Stalin had promised due to the poor
harvest  of  1936  (section  5);  whom  to  blame  of  sabotage  for  the  failure  to  increase
agricultural production and the spread of animal epidemic diseases (section 6); the desire
among the agricultural producers to elude “bonded labour” by leaving the kolkhoz and
returning to private farming after the good harvest of 1937 (section 7). Finally the paper
examines the attempt by the People’s Commissar Ivan Benediktov in 1939 to take stock of
agricultural policy and development (section 8) and explores the grandiose regional plans
for  the  transformation  of  nature  (section  9).  A  concluding  section  discusses  the
paradoxical character of state action in Soviet agricultural policy (section10). 
 
1-Did collectivisation mean a transition to
“industrialised agrarian production” ?
4 Before the onset of collectivisation, the party had always described Socialist agriculture
as fully mechanised large‑scale enterprises based on tractor power. In connection with
the First Five‑Year Plan, the first initial projects were worked out on an experimental
basis for establishing model large‑scale agrarian enterprises. Especially ambitious were
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plans  to  bring  together  agricultural  and  industrial  production  in  the  form  of
agro‑industrial combines and to equalize the divide between living conditions in urban
areas and the countryside by means of “agro‑cities.”6 The agro‑industrial combines, such
as  those  drafted  by  Ia. Nikulikhin  at  the  beginning  of  the  1930s,  were  designed  to
encompass an area of ca. 20,000 hectares.7 Ambitious plans were worked out to settle the
nomads in Kazakhstan.8 Huge state investments would have been required to realise each
of these projects in anticipation of the envisioned future structure of agriculture. At the
end of  the 1920s,  the planners were convinced that  the prerequisites  to move on to
“industrialised”  agriculture  in  a  larger‑scale  framework  were  not  yet  given.
Consequently, the First Five‑Year Plan, even in its “optimal variant” adopted in April
1929,  expected that small‑scale farming would still  remain dominant over the longer
term.9 Only after industrialisation had created the proper prerequisites would the general
transition  to  large‑scale  enterprises  in  agriculture  then  also  gain  traction  in  the
mid‑1930s.10 
5 As is well known, the forced collectivisation torpedoed all these plans. It was based in the
winter 1929‑30 on the massive use of force against the peasants. Collectivisation now no
longer aimed at creating well‑structured large‑scale agrarian enterprises. Rather, with
the “struggle for grain,” it sought solely to subjugate the peasants, who supposedly were
sabotaging Socialist construction. The “dwarf kolkhozes” that arose in the transition to
the 1930s usually brought together only a small number of peasant communities, and
with approximately 400 hectares of land, had only one tenth of the minimal land area
originally  planned  for  the  large‑scale  enterprises  at  their  disposal.  In  addition,  the
kolkhozes  only  possessed  equipment  for  small‑scale  farming,  since  mechanised
technology  from  1930  on  was  supplied  exclusively  to  state  farms  or  machine‑tractor
stations. The ambitious projects of individual planners such as Nikulikhin thus came to
nought.  In  view of  the  striking  lack  of  agricultural  technology  and  the  necessity  of
concentrating the available means for investment in industry,  beginnings were made
locally to establish some “kolkhoz giants” and to sell off the inventory of the peasants.
But since the state did not provide any funding, the enterprises existed solely on paper,
and already in the spring of 1930 they reverted once more into individual farmsteads.11
6 To date the literature has paid scant attention to the fact that the regime reacted to the
famine in 1932/33, which had been caused by the brutal expropriation of the agricultural
produce, by introducing a fundamental reform in their agrarian policy. This points up
just how dangerous Stalin regarded the situation that had developed.12 In order not to
jeopardise his rule,  he was unable to admit publicly that forced industrialisation and
collectivisation  had  caused  a  famine  with  its  millions  of  victims.13 The  forced
collectivisation had been driven solely  by  the  interest  of  the  state  to  subjugate  and
expropriate the peasantry. The now established “kolkhoz system” was meant to put an
end to the arbitrariness that the agricultural producers had formerly been subjected to.
In substance, this was a compromise between the interests of the state and those of the
peasants. With the return to the principle of tax in kind through obligatory delivery of
agricultural products per hectare or animal to the state, it ensured the state a very high
proportion  of  agricultural  produce  without  having  to  completely  cover  the  costs  of
production. In addition, it took the interests of the kolkhoz members (kolkhozniki) into
account: with the granting of the right to private plots (and the temporary furthering of
maintenance of private productive animals) and a “prepayment of natural goods” during
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the  threshing  based  on  achieved  labour  days  (trudodni)  as  a  basis  for  the  income
distribution at year’s end, it secured the kolkhozniki the possibility to survive.14 
7 The “kolkhoz system” was in existence from 1933 until the forced enlargement of the
kolkhozes between 1949 and 1953. From its inception, it put an end for the next two
decades to all experiments in the direction of an “industrialised” agricultural production.
By separating private plots from kolkhoz production, it  conserved primitive forms of
agricultural production. Under Stalin, the kolkhoz economy remained largely limited to a
small  number of plant cultures.  The production of potatoes,  fruit and vegetables and
livestock farming was principally on the private plots. The inclusion of cattle breeding
within  the  kolkhozes  would  have  required  large  investments,  inter  alia  in  livestock
stables. Since the prices paid by the state did not cover production costs, any increase in
production or involvement in new production branches necessarily had to augment the
losses of the kolkhozes (and thus the unpaid compulsory “bonded labour” demanded of
its members).15 With collectivisation, the enterprises lost control over the quality of field
cultivation, since that was increasingly taken over by the machine‑tractor stations (MTS).
Tractors were supplied solely to the MTS and remained state property. Mechanisation
served  principally  for  purposes  of  control,  and  in  conjunction  with  the  political
departments established in 1933,  functioned additionally as a means to discipline the
kolkhozniki, but did not assist in modernising agriculture. From the mid‑1930s on, grain
was thus expropriated directly on the fields, circumventing the kolkhoz storage barns.16
For  the  most  part,  both  the  MTS  directors  and  the  kolkhoz  chairmen  lacked  even
elementary knowledge of agriculture production. Their function was mainly to execute
what the party ordered while intimidating their workforce.17 In many areas of  work,
manual labour predominated. There were no new approaches to making the heavy work,
performed principally by females, any easier.18 Only after Stalin’s death was the project of
“industrialised agricultural production” given new life, revived in the 1960s.19
8 At the end of the 1920s, per hectare yields in plant cultivation and animal performance
were  still  very  low in  the  Soviet  Union in  comparison to  other  European countries.
Instead of rising, they even worsened in the 1930s.20 This presents a devastating picture of
the performance of the large‑scale Soviet agricultural enterprises. In the case of grain
and potatoes,  the hectare yields were on average some 15% gross below those of the
small‑scale farmsteads. In the case of sugar beet and cotton cultivation, the yields in the
first half of the 1930s declined even further. From 1935 on, they recovered and quickly
rose, although not reaching the pre‑1914 levels. Rising yields of sugar beets and cotton
were based on a drastic increase in producer prices, which then covered the production
costs incurred. In the case of sugar beet cultivation, small work teams were organised;
these units were responsible for all  working operations.  In the cotton kolkhozes,  the
kolkhoz members received cash payments from 1935 on large enough to enable them to
cover their food needs by purchases in the marketplace.21 By contrast,  in the case of
potatoes and grain, the prices paid by the state for the compulsory delivery of produce
ultimately covered only some 20% of production costs.22 
 
2-The forced collectivisation 1929‑1932 : Loss of
control over the soil
9 It was counterproductive to commence with the desired acceleration of the development
of  agricultural technology  by  compulsory  making  an  extensive  change  in  agrarian
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structure. The abrupt replacement of small‑scale farming by kolkhozes and state farms
stripped all previously achieved success in land settlement (zemleustroistvo) and land
consolidation of its basis. It was necessary to start all over again from the beginning, and
even that could not be done unless the situation with land for the new enterprises had
been stabilised. 
10 The party leadership was initially convinced that tractors and large‑scale farming would
guarantee  progress  in  agricultural  technology:  the  tractor  was  expected  to  solve  all
agricultural‑technological  questions.23 They  consciously  accepted  the  concomitant
destruction of peasant means of production, because that loss would be “compensated a
hundred times over by the huge advantages that we shall gain through the new Socialised
forces  of  production.”24 Speaking  before  the  November  plenary  in  1929,  Molotov
explained that financing would be achieved through the expropriation of the peasants
during collectivisation.25 However, he did not explain how investments could be financed
from this,  since  peasant  inventory  would  necessarily  lose  its  total  market  value.  In
practice, land consolidation and settlement constituted the prerequisites for achieving
improved working of the fields through the use of tractors. In addition, development in
the agricultural sector was burdened by the fact that the party did not return to the
principle of “one‑man leadership”, as it had done in 1931 in the case of industry. Rather,
given  its  profound  distrust  of  the  peasantry,  the  party  interfered  constantly  in  the
agricultural  production  process.  It  sought  to  control  each  and  every  activity.
Furthermore,  until  his  death,  Stalin  resolutely  adhered  to  the  idea  of  demanding  a
“tribute” from the peasants for the industrialisation.26 
11 Agrarian experts such as Moisej Vol´f, who was among the designers of the first Five‑Year
Plan  for  agriculture,  publically  expressed  their  reservations  regarding  hasty
collectivisation and their fears about dramatic consequences due to rural overpopulation.
Under Stalin’s regime, which did not countenance critical suggestions, they had to pay a
high price. At the highpoint of the famine in early 1933, Vol´f was arrested and executed
soon thereafter.27 In actual fact, the introduction of forced collectivisation in the winter
of  1929/1930 was  implemented  without  any  organisational  preparation.  The  party
leadership did not articulate its initial ideas on elementary questions, such as how in
their  view a  kolkhoz  should  function,  until  March  1930  with  the  publication  of  the
Agricultural Artel Statutes.  The fact that some peasants refused to join the collective
enterprise despite continuing pressure28 increased the confusion as  to what  land the
kolkhoz could have at its disposal.
12 With  forced  collectivisation,  the  decisive  prerequisite  for  the  introduction  of  crop
rotation was lost for a long period. To achieve that goal, the land would have had to be
allotted to clearly designated enterprises for at least the duration of three crop rotations.
Due to their virtual obsession with the aim of breaking the resistance of the recalcitrant
peasants, the party leadership initially failed to recognise the dangerous side effects of
their policy. The local authorities were no less arbitrary in allotting land to the kolkhozes
than in dealing with individual peasants. In their eyes, the dwarf kolkhozes enjoyed no
protection, since they were not in keeping with the large‑scale enterprises that were the
primary goal. For that reason, local authorities resorted to applying pressure in order to
force the merging of kolkhozes.  In 1932 and 1933 they tried to merge all  enterprises
served by a single MTS into a large kolkhoz.29 Since the actual development of hectare
yield depended on the available tractive power,  the phasing out and demise of  work
horses exacerbated the situation even further: agricultural productivity slumped and the
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poorly cultivated croplands were covered in weed. In the 1930s, the supply of tractors did
not compensate for the loss in animal horse power. It was not until the 1950s that the
level of tractive power of 1928 was reached again and subsequently exceeded on a lasting
basis.30 
13 In practice, taking grain for delivery to the state had unconditional priority. The law “On
the  Protection  of  Socialist  Property,”  drafted  by  Stalin  personally  in  August  1932,
extended the property claim by the state on grain already in its stage of growth ripening
on the fields.  Consistent with this, in 1933 the statistical  harvest survey was revised.
Instead of  being classified as  “barn harvest,”  now the term “biological  harvest”  was
applied to everything that had matured in the fields up to the point of harvesting.31 As a
consequence,  all  harvest  losses  were  now  at  the  expense  of  the  kolkhoz  members.
Depending on climatic conditions, the losses ranged between 20 and 30%. In the summer
and autumn of 1932, some starving kolkhozniki were shot in accordance with the new
law, because they had stolen ears from the fields.  The local  state authorities quickly
understood that they were obliged to deliver grain to the state under all circumstances.
For that reason, they had neither interest in nor understanding for the measures of land
consolidation.  The only thing that  mattered to them was a  short‑term demonstrable
success.  Short‑sighted,  they  thought  just  as  little  as  the  party  leadership  about  the
foreseeable long‑term consequences and ultimate costs of their actions.
 
3-Kolhhoz system and crop rotation : The first
campaign for land consolidation 1932‑1935
14 In the autumn of 1932, the party and government endeavoured to bring some order into
the arbitrary practices of land allotment. They accused the local authorities of having
acted on their own in channelling off kolkhoz land for setting up state farms or other
state purposes, and of having changed the boundaries between the kolkhozes without
their approval. Boundary changes from now on were only to be permissible if at least
three‑fourths of the members of the kolkhoz affected had agreed and changes had been
subsequently approved by the Oblast´ Land Department.32 
15 The  party  leadership  became  aware  that improvement  in  cultivation  techniques
constituted a  prerequisite  for  increasing hectare  yields.  This  recognition made them
dependent on the experts who alone could work out scientifically grounded crop rotation
schemes. However, they also mistrusted these experts.33 In 1932, the party leadership
ordered a land settlement campaign and the introduction of crop rotations. However, in
an atmosphere still marked by measures of brutal compulsion against the peasants, they
neglected to create the conditions for the successful implementation of their directives.
The brief deadline they stipulated ignored the fact that land consolidation together with
the  reaping  of  crop  rotation  fields  inside  the  enterprises  was  labour‑intensive  and
associated with various expenses. However, the party leadership sought to curb the local
authorities in their arbitrary approach to the existing kolkhozes and to grant the latter a
conditional guarantee of continuance in regard to the land allotted to them. 
16 The “kolkhoz system” made it more difficult to introduce crop rotations. Since a tax in
kind on the land sown had to be paid, the interest of the local authorities and the party
leadership in the struggle for grain now concentrated on the area of land sown in grain.
However,  every introduction of  crop rotations designed to  increase  yield  necessarily
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presupposed some reduction in the area of land for grain cultivation. Hectare yields and
thus  the  grain  harvest  as  a  whole  would  have  indeed  clearly  increased.  Yet this
correlation was too complicated for a control based on compulsion. For that reason, in
practice every crop rotation that limited the area of land for sowing grain was deemed a
crime against  the state.  As  a  result,  the professional  execution of their  work locally
became a challenge fraught with incalculable risks for the agrarian experts. 
17 The first  campaign to  introduce  crop rotation was  carried  out  solely  on  paper.  The
compulsion exerted by the party did result in 1935 that for some 80% of the kolkhozes,
“crop rotations” were registered in the files of the agricultural authorities. But in practice
they  were  not  heeded.  In  many instances,  enterprises  were  not  even aware  of  such
registered rotations and they were not in keeping with the plans for sowing. Since in
many areas kolkhoz members were going hungry and there was a lack of  any order
whatsoever in the kolkhozes, land surveyors (zemlemer) had initially not even gone to
the kolkhoz enterprises. Given the pressure under which they worked themselves, they
rather immediately reported to their superiors about the successful implementation of
the measure.
18 In May 1933, at the very highpoint of the famine and death by starvation, the People’s
Commissariat  for Agriculture  (NKZ)  criticised that  when arranging the  crop rotation
fields for the kolkhozes, the “hunt for quantity was proceeding apace at the expense of
quality.”  Work  was  being  done  sitting  at  office  desks.  They  were  not  ensuring  any
increase  in  yields,  because  they  did  not  proceed  from  the  differing  fertility  of  the
individual land plots, and in many cases even included land that could not be sown and
cultivated at  all.34 A  report  in  1935  sketched a  bleak  picture  of  the  quality  of  work
performed. As a rule, the crop rotation fields were registered on antiquated file cards, in
part stemming from the 1860s, without any local check of the actual situation on the
ground. The areas of land registered frequently did not jibe with the actual boundaries of
the kolkhozes  and took neither  meadows nor  grazing land into account.35 Surveyors
described the situation as follows: the kolkhozes were not masters over their own land.
The plan for sowing was worked out in the raion centre at someone’s desk, the machinery
from the  MTS arrived when it  was  the  respective  kolkhoz’s  turn,  and the  machines
employed were often too heavy for the soil.36 Pictures of soil conditions in the Sofanovo
Raion (West Oblast´) taken by staff workers of the Research Institute for the Organisation
of the Territory document that in many instances, grain was planted on boundary soils
that permitted only very low hectare yields. Cultivation of this land was nothing but a
sheer waste of seeds and labour power.37
 
4-The transfer of land to the kolkhozes “for unlimited
use, i.e. in perpetuity”
19 In 1935, times appeared favourable for stabilising conditions likewise in the countryside.
Collectivisation  had  been  concluded,  aside  from  a  few  “retirees”  who  restricted
themselves to self‑support.38 After a phase of severe social upheaval and heavy repression
during forced industrialisation and forced collectivisation, a certain level of stabilisation
emerged. Naum Jasny speaks of the “three good years” 1934-1936, in which a high level of
industrial growth was achieved and the standard of living, which had declined markedly
in  the  early  1930s,  was  again  on  the  rise.39 With  his  encouraging  appeal:  “Life  has
improved,  comrades.  Life  has  become more joyous!,”  Stalin sought  to bolster  up the
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population,  infusing  them  with  renewed  courage,  and  invited  them  to  hope  for  a
“prosperous” life in the foreseeable future.40 The actual achieved current state in the
building of “Socialism” was formalised in the “Socialist” 1936 Constitution of the USSR. 
20 At  the  2nd  All‑Union  Congress  of  the  Kolkhoz  Shock‑Workers  in  February  1935  in
Moscow,  Mikhail  Chernov,  the  People’s  Commissar  for  Agriculture,  reminded  his
audience that Stalin in 1933 had set the goal of making the kolkhozniki prosperous.41 In
the Kolkhoz Statutes passed by the Congress, he now combined this goal directly with
improving cultivation techniques and the introduction of crop rotation fields.42 Iakov
Iakovlev, who had advanced to Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, noted that
there was still a substantial lack of clarity as to what land belonged to what kolkhoz, and
he castigated the illegal changing of kolkhoz boundaries, a practice still widespread, in
which land was allotted to other kolkhozes or to state farms.43
21 The new Kolkhoz Statutes included precise regulations for land use. The land should be
assigned to the kolkhoz as a closed area of usable agricultural land, while excluding any
elements that might give rise to a conflict situation. The land remained state property,
but the kolkhozes were now to receive it “for unlimited use, i.e. in perpetuity.” The state
certificate concerning its land was to be presented to the kolkhoz in a special ceremony.
This certificate should specify the size and precise boundaries of the land assigned. After
that, any reduction in the surface area was not permissible, but enlargement was possible
by means of land from the state fund or land from individual peasants.  The Kolkhoz
Statutes demanded that the land be divided into crop rotation fields and that specified
sections be allocated to each field brigade for the entire duration of a crop rotation.44 
22 It becomes clear to what extent this spectacular decision to hand over the land to the
kolkhozes “in perpetuity” was born out of necessity to finally overcome the continuing
chaos in the allotment of land and the definition of its boundaries. This is evident when
we note how distant actually existing kolkhozes were from what experts had regarded in
1929 as the ideal Socialist large‑scale enterprise (“agro‑industrial combines”). Many of
the dwarf kolkhozes that had emerged were too small to employ tractors and combine
harvesters in an optimal manner.
23 The  fact  that  it  was  not  until  the  mid‑1930s  when  the  external  boundaries  of  the
kolkhozes were established at all underscores the level of chaos created by the forced
collectivisation. In part, the land of the kolkhoz was located ten or more kilometres from
the economic centre of a given kolkhoz. The schematic drawings on land available to the
raion land authorities indicated too great an area of land for many kolkhozes. The sowing
plan then demanded to cultivate more land than they actually had available, and also to
deliver grain from that (non‑existent) land area as well.
24 Management, planning and control over land settlement were now transferred to the
NKZ.  The  departments  for  farmland  arrangement  in  the  local  land  authorities  were
assigned the task of drafting the concrete measures for local land consolidation and the
introduction of crop rotation.45 The official state certificates were to be issued only after
conclusion of the land consolidation and the elimination of all deficiencies. The external
boundaries of the kolkhoz had to be clearly marked by boundary posts and confirmed by
the assembly of the kolkhoz members.46 
25 In conjunction with the new survey of land between mid‑1935 and mid‑1937, there was
also a handover of non‑utilised land of the state farms to the kolkhozes. Smaller and in
particular non‑profitable state farms were totally dissolved.47 In this way, the state rid
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itself of such state farms that previously had only incurred losses, and at the same time
forced the kolkhoz members to assume the cultivation of these largely exhausted and
leached out areas of land. The kolkhoz was obligated to deliver grain as a natural tax “in
kind” to the state. This was a good arrangement for the state: it continued to receive the
grain,  but  because  the  kolkhozniki  were  now producing  it,  the  state  no  longer  was
required to cover the costs of production. In addition, the state extorted money from the
kolkhozniki, because they had to pay for the valuables of the dissolved state farms which
they had taken into possession: the conventional price had to be paid for mother animals,
and in the case of  buildings,  the carrying value of the property,  while deducting for
depreciation.48 The  archival  material  is  silent  about  the  prevailing  mood among the
kolkhoz members under this dispensation.
26 Work on surveying the land and the associated issuance of state certificates dragged on
far longer than originally planned, since now there was actually an attempt to carry out
farmland arrangements locally. The evident contradictions in policy were not discussed
publically:  namely that  crop rotations  could only  be successfully  implemented if  the
enterprises were left certain freedoms for action, and that in grain cultivation, the state
was demanding unpaid forced labour from the kolkhozniki. 
27 A more primitive technology was employed in 1936 on the kolkhoz land in the West
Oblast´ than before in the small‑scale farmsteads. The loss of horses had scarcely been
compensated by the supply of tractors in the non‑Black Earth Region. As a result, the
capacities for implementing fieldwork had declined dramatically.49 In other regions as
well,  there were encroachments  on the kolkhozes  in order  to  force them to greater
deliveries of  grain after the poor harvest of  1936.  According to Iakovlev,  the Central
Committee Secretary for Agriculture, the sowing plans in Krai Saratov inter alia violated
the crop rotations in many places. Several raions forced the kolkhozes to sow grain in soil
that  was  evidently  unsuited  for  cultivation.  It  was  said  they  were  for  that  reason
chronically in arrears with their deliveries to the state.50 In the Leningrad Oblast´, in the
autumn of 1936 the area of land registered as a kolkhoz sowing area exceeded the actually
existing land by some 10%.51 
28 The experts on the spot locally were very dissatisfied due to the contradictory nature of
the central directives issued at the same time. At the Kolkhoz Department in the Research
Institute for  the Organisation of  the Territory,  a  consultation was convened in early
February 1937.52 Mikhail Semenov, Senior Engineer in the Leningrad Department for Land
Settlement, criticised the introductory lecture that had been given: he thought it was too
abstract, divorced from reality and had not dealt with the problems in the north. He
noted that he had been assigned the task of introducing crop rotations in 1937 for 4,500
kolkhozes  on  1.2  million  hectares.  He  stated  that  this  was  impossible  if  scientific
requirements were to be met. In addition, he stated that no kolkhoz was prepared to pay
the fee of six to seven roubles per hectare for this.53 Maslov (Saratov) pointed out that
crop rotations had already been introduced in 1935. He noted that the material in the
raions was based on that. Maslov stressed that to that extent, the question of what crop
rotation the individual kolkhoz should receive had already been decided on in advance.
Moreover, the Raion Land Department was proceeding on the assumption that the area of
land registered for  the individual  kolkhozes actually existed.  Now it  was evident,  he
added, that the agronomists in 1935 had decided on the crop rotations without knowledge
of the quality of the soil, and that many of their calculations were incorrect. A substantial
portion of the land declared in 1935 to be suitable for grain could, he noted, be used in the
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best case only for grazing pasture. His farmland arrangement team now had to transform
50‑60% of the land area allotted for growing wheat into crop rotation areas for forage
grass instead, because the soil structure was not suitable, and the team had to correct the
specialisation of the kolkhozes. “We just don’t know at the moment how we can solve
these problems.” He asked: did the NKZ have to issue the permit? If they classified too
much  land  as  unsuitable  for  grain  cultivation,  that  move  would  be  viewed  as  an
“anti‑state activity.”54 
 
5-The extensive loss of selected seeds after the poor
harvest 1936
29 The poor harvest of 1936 served to spotlight a second unsolved problem alongside the
introduction  of  crop  rotation:  how  could  selected  seeds  be  protected  if  after  every
harvest, delivery of grain to the state had absolute priority? As a result of the rigorous
amassing of grain by the state, in 1936 a substantial proportion of the selected seeds
ended  up  in  the  state  grain  mills.55 The  party’s  attention  was  called  to  this  during
preparations for the spring sowing campaign in 1937.56 In customary style,  it  blamed
scapegoats for the problem. In June 1937, the Central Committee (TsK) plenary strongly
criticized  the  chief  administration  for  grain  within  the  NKZ.  It  alleged  that  this
administrative body had sabotaged the task of the Five‑Year Plan and opened a door to
the possibility of introducing poor seed varieties. It stated that for all practical purposes,
good peasant seeds had disappeared. The TsK claimed existing selected seeds had been
partially ground in the mill due to insufficient marking and had been mixed with other
seeds in the state warehouses. It argued that the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of the
Interior) and the courts would have to clarify now where bureaucratic error ended and
criminal “wrecking” appeared.57 
30 From 1939 on, all kolkhozes and state farms were permitted only to use selected seeds
that  were adapted to the local  conditions.  In 1937,  the state was finally prepared to
assume full  financing of the state selection stations.58 In addition, material incentives
were created: beginning in 1937, selection stations and plant breeders were to be given a
special award by allowing them to participate in the profits gained by varieties they had
helped to breed or improve.  Several  penalties were instituted to put an end to their
misuse of selected seeds. Misuse for an unintended purpose would be punished by two
years forced labour, while mixing of selected grain seeds would even entail a penalty of
up to three years forced labour.59 The rigorous penalties came into effect already in the
autumn of 1937. Kolkhoz chairmen, weight recorders and bookkeepers were sentenced to
imprisonment and forced labour because they had declared simple seeds to be selected
seed varieties.60 The seed‑ producing kolkhozes would also be rewarded by paying them
double the state price for grain.61 Yet this was unable to spur an incentive for production.
Even if this compensated the kolkhozes for 40% of production costs instead of just 20%,
the bottom line here was still that the kolkhozes were not being totally paid for what they
were producing. 
31 The disconnect with reality is underscored by the fact that the “quality standards” for
seed lowered in November 1935 by the NKZ became the target of sharp critique. By that
move, the NKZ had sought to bring standards more into line with the actual condition of
the selected seeds, and had therefore increased permitted weed infestation to 0.5‑1%. It
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had even increased the permitted level of infection with grain blight by a factor of 20.
From now on, the grain distributed by the State Fund for Selected Seeds was once again
supposed to be totally free of blight and weed seeds.62 Many leaders of the State Fund
were dubious about the prospects of adhering to these norms. In numerous instances,
“selected seeds” provided to kolkhozes in the obligatory exchange were actually inferior
to the seeds which the kolkhozes had to deliver in exchange.63 
32 The decree did not improve the selected seeds available. Large amounts continued to lose
their germination capacity due to poor storage conditions in the State Fund facilities. At
the end of 1937, 67% of the wheat seed in the kolkhozes in Ukraine were contaminated.64
A  substantial  portion  of  the  seed  for  sowing  in  1938  was  infested  with  mites  or
contaminated, in many cases it had but a very low germination capacity.65 In early 1939,
Benediktov pointed to a further cause of the calamity: there was a lack of proper sheds
for storing the selected seeds. He accused the State Planning Commission of not having
provided sufficient investment funding for construction of storage space.66
33 After the poor harvest in 1939, the party and government once again rescinded their
threats of penalties in connection with the protection of the selected seeds. This more
easy access to seed enabled the local  organs of  authority to fulfil  their obligation to
deliver grain to the state.67 In 1940, the MTS units even encouraged their tractorists not
to  adhere  to  the  regulations  of  agrarian  technology,  so  as  not  to  endanger  the  full
implementation of the plans for sowing in view of the reduced norms instituted for fuel
consumption.68
 
6-The execution of the cautioners : Agronomists as
scapegoats
34 Many agrarian experts were murdered in 1937 and 1938 because the party leadership
blamed them for the miserable production results. The poor harvest of 1936 had once
again set back the agricultural sector. The “prosperous life” that Stalin had promised thus
receded into a seemingly distant future. The transition to terror in agriculture was also
based on the contradictory directives for the issuance of state certificates: on the one
hand,  they  were  intended  to  formalise  and  codify  crop  rotations  grounded  on  solid
science, while on the other, the surface area for grain cultivation was not permitted to be
reduced in the sowing plans. It was impossible to achieve both aims simultaneously. This
contradiction in the dictatorship could not be discussed publically and thus could not be
resolved. In order to deflect attention from the responsibility of the party leadership,
concrete individuals in the state bureaucracy were scapegoated, accused of wrongdoing.69
The  failure  to  increase  yields  was  portrayed  as  the  failure  of  experts  in  the  land
authorities and the NKZ. Only after almost all the experts had been executed in 1938 and
the hectare yields nonetheless had not increased was there in 1939 a half‑hearted change
of  direction  in  policy,  yet  policy  continued  to  adhere  to  state  compulsion  against
agricultural producers.
35 The terror had specifically targeted those individuals who had tried to implement the
party directives of 1935 on the introduction of scientifically grounded crop rotations. The
fact that the West Oblast´ was chosen to be made an example had to do with the poor
suitability  of  soil  there  for  agriculture  and  the  spread  of  small  kolkhozes  as  a
consequence. Many kolkhozniki in the West Oblast´ still lived on individual farmsteads,
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so‑called khutory. The introduction of crop rotation threatened a drastic reduction in the
grain cultivation area. This would have decreased the obligatory delivery of grain to the
state, but would have nonetheless caused local grain production to increase due to higher
hectare yields. The First Party Secretary in the West Oblast´, I.P. Rumiantsev, was now
portrayed to be a “wrecker.” He was pilloried and charged with total blame before the
eyes of the population. There is no reason to give credence to these charges and to make a
purported “weakness in the rural bureaucracy” responsible for the mistakes.70 In April
1937, the paper Izvestiia sounded an alarm regarding these “anti‑state practices” rife in
the West Oblast´: it alleged that the soil was “disappearing” there in numerous raions. It
charged that “wreckers” were active, seeking to sabotage the state plan of grain sowing
using all means available, and to that end, they were falsely describing “fertile farmland”
as grazing pasture, swap or thick brush land.71 Rumiantsev and many staff members in his
Oblast´  administration  were  relieved  of  their  duties  on  17  June  1937,  subsequently
arrested and soon thereafter executed.72 The Moscow party leadership pilloried these
individuals, making an egregious example of them across the Soviet Union, supposedly
responsible  for  the  exceptionally  poor  production  results  in  the  kolkhozes.  In  local
show‑trials,  the  population  was  presented  with  their  “activity  as  parasites”  in  the
issuance of state certificates. The West Oblast´ party leadership was accused of having
artificially caused unrest by having rejected (for formal reasons) complaints against the
establishing of fixed boundaries for kolkhozes and separating off land from kolkhozes set
up for various nationalities. The Oblast´ leadership was also accused of having allotted
land to kolkhozes which was located at a great distance from the kolkhoz centre or had
been assigned to other kolkhozes.  It  was claimed that many kolkhozes had lost their
meadows, original private plot land and gardens.73 
36 In  view  of  the  evident  priority  that  the  party  leadership  accorded  land  for  grain
cultivation,  comments  by  the  People’s  Commissar  for  Agriculture  Chernov  speaking
before the TsK plenary in 1937 caused some dismay. He could not mention in particular
that  this  demand was  incompatible  with the  order  for  introduction of  genuine crop
rotations. Consequently, he simply acted as if this contradiction did not exist at all, and
subsequently paid for that with his  life.74 Before the plenary,  Chernov criticised that
economically efficient kolkhozes were still being excessively overburdened and for that
reason did not develop any interest in increasing yields per hectare: “If a kolkhoz does
not fulfil the sowing plan, its obligation is transferred to the other kolkhoz.”75 He cited
many  examples  where  the  sowing  obligations  assigned  exceeded  the  actual  fields
cultivable after crop rotation by up to 30%. In individual cases, the sowing obligation
assigned to kolkhozes even exceeded their entire available land area. In the West Oblast´,
kolkhozes had been required to sow grain for four consecutive years, in areas for cotton
cultivation they had been obliged to plant cotton for seven to eight years in succession.
This, he stressed, could explain the low yields per hectare. Consequently, Chernov raised
the demand that every official should be brought to trial who had imposed a sowing plan
on the kolkhoz that violated the crop rotation.76 The issue of the inherent contradiction
between the central  instructions  for  introducing crop rotation and requirements  for
grain delivery to the state was solved by means of state terror: Chernov was arrested soon
after the plenary on 7 November and later executed as an “enemy of the people.” 
37 A long report by the NKVD on “Wrecking in Agriculture” assigned the experts blame for
the fact that productivity in agriculture had not risen. They were charged, as “wreckers,”
with having intentionally brought about the catastrophic conditions.77 The report peaked
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in the assertion that the head of the NKZ Department of Finance had confessed that the
agronomy experts had intentionally devised and introduced a harmful system of crop
rotation. In 1937, he noted that the Planning Finance Department had been cleansed of
enemies of the people, but that Chernov had actually only replaced former “wreckers” by
new ones drawn from the Research Institute for Agroeconomy.78 Those individuals had
intentionally spread animal epidemic diseases in a bid to sabotage the construction of
large‑scale livestock breeding. The dissolving of state farms in 1936 was now likewise
classified as the result of “activity by wreckers.” The “enemies of the people,” it was
alleged, had especially targeted the land authorities, and to that end had taken over the
direction there from the People’s Commissar all the way down the ladder into the land
departments at the level of oblast´ and raion.79 The regime concentrated its total energy
on exposing the “human parasites” that it could present to the population. This was in
keeping with the ideology, according to which the class enemy was seeking to undermine
Socialist construction by all available means. The animal husbandry enterprises set up on
orders from the state proved to be an ideal breeding ground for epidemics. In 1936, in 44
of the 66 state farms for livestock breeding that were inspected, animals were found
suffering from brucellosis or other livestock epizootic diseases.80 With the transfer to the
kolkhozes of infected animals as breeding animals, the diseases spread to animals not yet
infected.  The  livestock  specialists  were  accused  of  having  intentionally  conspired  to
spread the epidemics.
38 The  terror  against  top‑echelon  functionaries  initially  targeted  the  head  of  the
Department of Agriculture in the TsK, the former People’s Commissar for Agriculture
Iakovlev. He was arrested on 12 October 1937. This was followed a few weeks later by the
arrest of the incumbent People’s Commissar for Agriculture, Chernov. Already earlier, his
decrees, such as the attempt to reduce the difference between the actual concrete harvest
and the  officially  registered  “biological”  harvest,  had  been declared  to  be  “parasitic
wrecker  activity.”  His  successor  Robert  Eikhe  was  likewise  targeted  after  but  a  few
months  in  office.  On 29 April  1938,  Eikhe was  arrested.  All  three  were  shot  and the
authorities for land were “cleansed” of their experts in a bid to suggest to the population
that they had been responsible for the fact that the “prosperous life” Stalin had promised
had  not  yet  materialised.  The  only  one  of  the  People’s  Commissars  for  Agriculture
surviving the terror was Benediktov, who succeeded Eikhe in April 1938. He was to die a
natural death at the age of 81. Benediktov had remained in office down to the death of
Stalin, some 15 years.
 
7-Bonded labour : Why the kolkhozniki did not want to
stay in the kolkhozes
39 After the good harvest of 1937, several kolkhoz members, for the first time since the
forced collectivisation, received sufficient grain for their “labour days” to cover their
own needs. Their reaction shocked the party leadership. A substantial number of them
wished to use this possibility as a door to escape from the forced institutional framework
of  the  kolkhoz  and  the  “bonded  labour”  demanded  there  by  the  state.  A  return  to
individual farming held out the promise once again to be able to determine their own
fate.  The prerequisite  for  that  consisted in  the  ownership of  a  horse,  denied to  the
kolkhozniki. It made the former kolkhoz member in the Soviet village under Stalin into
an  independent  small‑scale  entrepreneur,  opening  up  excellent  possibilities  for  new
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income. That was because many in the countryside,  including state enterprises,  were
badly  in  need  of  transport  services.  The  fact  that  families  with  many  children  also
declared their formal resignation from the kolkhoz, because as kolkhozniki they were
unable to feed their children, should have put the state to shame.81 In 1938, the party
leadership  reacted  with  alarm  to  these  reports.82 It  shifted  the  blame  for  the  low
payments given to the kolkhozniki to the local party and Soviet state officials.83 Stalin was
upset that the kolkhozniki were able to escape from the seemingly total blanket of state
control by means of resignation.84 In his provocative manner, he asked the TsK members
in 1939 whether they actually desired to return to small‑scale private farming, and at the
same  time  accused  them of  bearing  responsibility  for  this  trend  through  their  own
attitude of indifference. He called for putting the brakes in proper time on the rush back
to private small‑scale farming: Stalin noted that if the kolkhozes were to collapse, the
individual peasant would no longer need a tractor or combine harvester to work his small
plots of land. In his quasi‑natural private enterprise, he would be “reigning as the king on
his farmstead.”85 In addition, Stalin recommended that the “do‑nothings,” kolkhozniki
who earned only a few or no “labour days” in the kolkhoz, should be transferred to other
kolkhozes.86
40 Instead of asking about the underlying causes for the catastrophic living conditions in the
kolkhozes,  the party  reacted in  1938 and 1939 by resorting to  renewed measures  of
compulsion. A campaign against the “exclusions” of kolkhoz members was launched and
the horse tax was jacked up so much that no private person could any longer maintain a
work  horse.87 In  particular,  in  1939  the  party  began  with  two  large‑scale  inhumane
campaigns that worsened once more the living conditions of most kolkhozniki. In May
1939, they launched the struggle against the “illegal extension of the private plots.” All
areas of land that exceeded the size permitted by the statute were separated off. At the
same time, the animals maintained in personal ownership that exceeded the regionally
permissible  number  of  productive  animals  were  requisitioned.  However,  under  the
pretext of land consolidation, the campaign targeted in particular the 821,000 individual
farmsteads (khutor), particularly in the westerns areas of the Soviet Union. They were to
be resettled by force into the central locality of the kolkhoz.88 A forced resettlement into
the cotton kolkhozes based on similar pretexts targeted millions of mountain peasants in
the irrigations zones in the Caucasus and Central  Asia.89 This  meant that  millions of
people were deported into the central locality of the kolkhoz in an attempt to finally
eliminate  the  still  extant  remainders  of  individual  small‑scale  farm  holdings.  The
resettlement  was  carried  out  in  1939/1940  with  unimaginable  brutality.  Its
implementation concentrated on elimination of the khutors. Those persons affected had
to  deal  by  themselves  with  reconstructing  housing  in  the  central  settlement  of  the
kolkhoz. The funding promised to help build up the new settlements was never paid.90
41 The totally insufficient pay, aggravated by the highly seasonal nature of their labour,
caused many kolkhoz members to seek paid employment outside the kolkhoz, or also to
revert to their private plot and concentrate on that.91 As nominal “co‑owners” of their
kolkhoz they only received so‑called “labour days” in the registry. These were worthless
dashes on paper marking their proportion in “income distribution” at the end of the year,
while in the neighbouring kolkhoz, they were paid in cash for the same work as day
labourers. Since most of the non‑cotton‑growing kolkhozes did not earn any profit, they
were unable at the year’s end to distribute anything to their members. Exemplary for the
situation in the kolkhozes was remuneration in Artel Grechiskino near Starobel”shchina
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in Ukraine. A “labour day” in the fields in 1940 earned the labouring kolkhoznik just
64 kopeks. Even the 1.14 roubles per work day in animal production was scarcely more
than a sorry pittance. Only in viticulture was their labour actually worthwhile, earning
8.40 roubles for a “labour day.” All annual reports of the kolkhozes reveal similar data.
Rural dwellers achieved most of their income qua kolkhoz by means of small sales in the
bazaars and open markets. A day working on the small farmstead resulted as a rule in a
clearly higher income than a formal “labour day” in the kolkhoz.92
 
8-Benediktov’s sober assessment of the failure to
increase yields
42 Work on the Third Five‑Year Plan was delayed and begun late, due to the considerable
losses in trained workers within the planning bureaucracy as a consequence of the terror.
Government policy adhered to introducing crop rotations in an effort to increase yield
per hectare.  Benediktov,  the new People’s Commissar for Agriculture,  also wanted to
quickly improve agricultural production. He appeared to be more concerned to ensure
that the state programmes did not just remain words on paper and that crop rotations
would actually be implemented in the kolkhozes. Since the state sowing plans prevented
the kolkhozes in practice from adhering to their crop rotations, it is initially impressive
that Benediktov managed to arrange that no state sowing plan would be set up for 1940.
Rather,  it  was  decided that  the  kolkhozes  would  themselves  determine their  sowing
arrangement in keeping with their crop rotation. The law stated: 
[...]  to promote the initiative of the kolkhozniki in conjunction with the further
bettering  of  grain  yields,  to  strengthen  the  responsibility  of  the  kolkhozes  for
planning the sowing of individual grain cultures, and to include the broad mass of
the kolkhozniki in planning.93 
43 It was possible to interpret that as a concession by the party leadership to the position of
the agrarian experts. The latter were convinced that success in raising yield levels was
dependent largely on the producers themselves. Yet even now the actions by the party
remained ridden with contradiction. The plan for delivery to the state was not altered,
and  it  continued  to  order  the  kolkhozes  in  detail  as  to  what  set  quantities  of  the
individual cultures they were obliged to deliver to the state, no matter whether their crop
rotation made provisions for their actual planting or not.94 
44 Benediktov’s memo on the Third Five‑Year Plan submitted by Gosplan in March 1939
sketches the vision of a new beginning, because for the first time it openly addressed the
lack  of  material  incentives  for  the  agricultural  producers  and  the  insufficient  state
investments as problematic issues.95 Moreover, the memo, in its blunt stocktaking of the
failures of the past decade, suggested cautiously what the actual causes behind this were,
springing from the state system of compulsion.96 Benediktov evidently considered the
lack of material incentives for the agricultural producers and the burdens placed on the
largely insolvent kolkhozes as a major problem for the implementation of agro‑technical
progress. He demanded that at least the basic costs for agrarian modernisation should be
covered and borne by the state budget. There is a hint at more realism in Benediktov’s
suggestion that there should be more extended deadlines for completing work. But in the
memos and papers available, he did not comment on the actual problems, namely the
state‑determined producer prices that did not cover production costs, especially for grain
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and potatoes, and the state measures of compulsion that had turned the kolkhozniki into
veritable bonded labourers.97
45 Benediktov  also  called  for  resolute  measures  to  strengthen  work  discipline  in  the
kolkhozes.  He demanded the creation of small  work teams responsible for the entire
production process in dealing with technical cultures, pointing to the successes that had
been achieved since 1935 in this way. He noted that material incentives were important in
order to better motivate the kolkhoz members, as the government was indeed providing,
as a bonus in connection with sugar beet cultivation.98 He stressed that in this way the
high  degree  of  labour  fluctuation  could  also  be  countered  and  labour  productivity
increased. In this, Benediktov’s ideas recall to some extent Stalin’s recommendation on
struggling against fluctuations in industry, conceptions he had put forward in his speech
to economists in 1931 on “new tasks in economic construction.”99 Benediktov insisted
that  the  state  had  to  cover  all  costs  associated with  land  consolidation  within  the
enterprises. In his view, in order to end the substantial level of fluctuation due to low
wages, the land surveyor had to be put on an equal footing with the agronomists in the
land departments at the raion level, and their salary had to be increased from 200 to
700 roubles.100 His  report,  especially  prepared for  Stalin  and Molotov in  March 1939,
underscored the importance that Benediktov accorded to the introduction of the correct
crop  rotations.101 He  stressed  that  land  consolidation  and  working  out  of  the  crop
rotations had to be carried out with active hands‑on participation in the process by the
kolkhoz management and the kolkhoz activists. This was to occur under the responsible
leadership of the agronomist together with the land surveyor, the livestock and other
specialists.102 He criticised the fact that between 1932 and 1934, the kolkhozniki had not
participated in the drafting of the crop rotation plans, and that the land authorities had
often  issued  obligations  for  sowing  that  violated  the  crop  rotation  of  the  kolkhoz.
Benediktov announced that the crop rotations for individual branches of the economy
would be regulated by special directives.103 Noteworthy is the fact that Benediktov laid
down  a  comparatively  long  final  deadline  of  seven  years  for  concluding  with  the
enterprise‑internal farmland arrangement. Only at the end of 1944 would it be possible,
he reasoned, to finish work likewise in the peripheral areas. This underscores that this
time, action would not only be verbal: rather, people would also actually take up the task
at the local level, taking into account the existing financial capacities and capacities in
personnel. 
46 M.P. Kogtikova states that for the first time, only with this survey operation in 1939 were
various  complicating  factors  and  distance  of  the  land  from  the  kolkhoz  actually
eliminated,  noting  that  before  1939  only  a  very  small  number  of  kolkhozes  in  the
non‑Black Earth Region had had crop rotation available. At the beginning of 1941, these
then numbered 32,531, yet this was even less than 15% of the total number of kolkhozes.
All  work  activities  during  the  transition  to  the  1940s  were  aimed  at  introducing
grass‑field  systems.  A  fundamental  improvement  failed  to  materialise,  because  the
grasses sown achieved only very low yields per hectare.  Thus,  the hoped‑for positive
effect on animal husbandry also failed to materialise, nor was there much improvement
in soil fertility.104
47 Difficulties arose from 1938 on in the employment of farming technology. The supply of
news tractors flagged from 1937 on due to the upturn in armaments production, and the
supplying of trailed implements and combine harvesters slowed from 1938 onwards. This
impacted on the performance capability of agriculture, and fieldwork was significantly
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compromised. Now the wasteful way in which the sparse resources had been handled, the
result of an absence of strict budgetary restrictions,  took its revenge.105 It  drastically
limited the service life of the farming technology that had been supplied in comparison
with Western agriculture, and forced Soviet agriculture to rely on constant inputs. As a
result of poor maintenance and the extremely high rate of fluctuation among tractorists
and drivers of harvester combines,  even the number of serviceable tractors and land
machines declined from 1938 on.  The rationing of  fuel  was an additional  factor that
served to exacerbate problems. 
48 Eikhe had already warned in early 1938 about the growing discrepancy between supply of
tractors and provisioning of service facilities for their repair. Of the 5,819 MTS, 2,088 had
no workshop, and only 1,200 were equipped to carry out larger‑scale repairs. Eikhe noted
that  while  Stalin  had  given  priority  in  1934  to  regular  and  smaller‑scale  repairs,
“wreckers” had sabotaged the regular continual maintenance. Many tractors were now in
need of fundamental repairs.106 By contrast, Benediktov in 1939 regarded the insufficient
provision of investment funds by Gosplan as the main reason why the construction of
economic and residential buildings for the MTS had fallen far behind in the past several
years. He stated that there was still a lack of 1,400 MTS workshops for regular repairs, and
3,500 MTS had no heated parking areas for their cars.  Some 40% of  the tractors and
harvester combines also had to be left out in the open during the winter, since no shelters
were available. He also noted that there had been just as little concern when it came to
the living conditions of the tractorists and harvester combine operators. The MTS were
very  poorly  equipped  with  apartments  and  facilities  for  the  everyday  needs  of  the
workers.107 In addition, Benediktov noted, many MTS units had no storage tanks for fuel.
This was causing huge losses. Consequently, Gosplan would have to at least double the
projected budget allocation for the Third Five‑Year‑Plan.108 
49 The poor maintenance condition of the tractors and the delayed delivery of fuel and seed
material resulted in numerous accidents and long periods of idleness. This impacted on
the quality of the seeding: in many instances, the required measures for agro‑technology
were not adhered to and low‑quality seed material  was used.  The seeding norm was
lowered,  and  in  poorly  cultivated  fields,  sowing  was  regionally  done  by  hand.109
Corresponding  problems  beset  the  harvest.  Thus,  in  the  summer  of  1938,  the  NKVD
reported on difficulties encountered in deployment of harvester combines due to their
poor state of repair, the absence of spare parts and a high level of fluctuation among the
drivers.  The report noted that transport of the grain from the fields was also poorly
organised.110 Grain spoiled because it was left to lie unprotected along the railroad tracks.
111 Gosplan pointed to another cause for the high level of harvest losses in 1939, namely
that the harvester combine drivers bore no material responsibility for the quality of their
work. Moreover, they were even given a special prize while they caused high levels of
losses. Thus, a driver was granted a special award at the All‑Union Agricultural Exhibition
because over the span of 22 days, he had harvested 717 hectares. But the actual harvest
loss on his fields had amounted to 3.2 dt/ha grain (and thus almost half of the “biological”
harvest).112 
 
9-The plans for reshaping nature, 1940/1941
50 In a phase when investments were concentrated on the armaments sector, between 1939
and 1941 extensive measures were launched across a broad area to reshape nature. They
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entailed inter alia the draining of huge swampy areas in the west together with a new
“non‑Black Earth Region programme.” In the east, there were efforts centred on turning
the steppe into a fertile oasis.113 In all regions, forage production was to be placed under
state regulation in order to develop livestock farming in the kolkhozes. German agrarian
experts noted for posterity, after German troops had invaded Belorussia, that these plans
had begun to be implemented. They were clearly impressed by the work done in the
previous  months  there  in  the draining of  swamps.114 Thus,  immediately  prior  to  the
German attack in June 1941, an extensive programme to reshape agriculture had been
launched. As a caesura, it is certainly comparable with collectivisation. After ten years,
the structures that had arisen were to be reshaped in such a manner that hectare yields
and animal performance levels would be able to increase. The directive that land areas
were to be designated for planting forage guaranteed that the area for grain cultivation
would remain an embittered political contentious issue, because every such reduction
also lowered the amount of grain that was to be delivered to the state by the kolkhozes as
a tax in kind. 
51 The regional more precise crop rotations announced by Benediktov were instituted in
1940 and 1941. The decrees leave no doubt that the initially promised shifting of the
freedom of  decision to  the kolkhozes  did not  materialise.  Rather,  the crop rotations
continued to be centrally stipulated and controlled. The respective regional total area for
the individual cultures was prescribed mandatorily by law. From 1942 on, there were
once again central plans for sowing that would serve simultaneously as the basis for the
obligatory deliveries to the state for the individual kolkhozes. Thus, once again the need
for control triumphed over the freedom of decision by the enterprise, which was deemed
absolutely essential by the experts for increasing per hectare yield. 
52 The  first  corresponding  decree  was  issued  on  5  March  1940  for  the  Ukraine.115 It
formulated as its goal to create a “solid forage basis,” to fulfil  the prerequisite for a
complex  mechanisation,  and  to  increase  the  land  areas  under  garden  cultivation,
viticulture and perennial plantings. In the dry areas, it prescribed the planting of forest
protection strips to guard against wind erosion. The introduction of crop rotations was to
proceed hand in hand with land improvement  and breaking new ground.116 The law
stipulated centrally the extent of cultivation area according to cultures for Ukraine. After
a very brief transition period for the introduction of their crop rotations, the kolkhozes
were ordered to achieve these goals already in 1942. For that reason, the sowing plan
1942 for the entire Ukraine was immediately appended to the law as an enclosure.117 The
archival  material  indicates  that  behind the  scenes  once again,  the  principal  issue of
contention  was  the  extent  of  the  area  for  sowing  grain.  Here  the  party  achieved  a
“compromise”: namely that the area for grain cultivation from 1942 on should reach the
extent it had attained in 1937. By that point in time, the total area should be expanded
through newly reclaimed land.118 The crop rotations of the individual kolkhozes had to be
accommodated into the framework of the plan for cultivation. In keeping with this, the
local authorities continued even in 1940 to dispose over the kolkhoz land ad libitum and
to separate it off for diverse and sundry purposes. It was only the bureaucratic path that
had now become somewhat more complicated. The local violation of law now had to be
brought to the attention of the NKZ and then be approved by the government.119 The law
prescribed  the  relocation of  important  private  plot  production  branches  into  the
kolkhozes. In order to accomplish that successfully, the state would have had to make
substantial funding available for these highly labour‑intensive spheres – including animal
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husbandry, fruit and vegetable production – and would have had to offer the kolkhozniki
material incentives for their additional labour. Yet Stalin was as little ready to do that in
1940 as he had been at the beginning of forced collectivisation in 1929. The elevation of
agriculture and increasing of per hectare yields would continue to be based principally on
state  measures  of  compulsion.  To  the  extent  that  in  individual  cases,  “material
incentives” were promised, those incentives could not become effective due to adherence
to the “calculation of the biological harvest.” Under the most favourable circumstances,
the  losses  of  what  had  matured  on  the  “stalk”  and  was  thus  registered  as  “official
harvest” amounted to 20% of what was brought in from the fields and ended up in the
kolkhoz barns. But it was impossible to distribute what had not been gathered in from the
field. For that reason, a natural distribution “in kind” of the “additional yields” did not as
a rule occur, neither for potatoes nor for grain.120
 
10-General findings : The paradox of state action in
the field of agricultural policy
53 From the time of the 1906 Stolypin agrarian reforms on, the state had interfered actively
in production in order to decrease the level of backwardness that had existed at the
starting point baseline vis‑à‑vis Western Europe. The Soviet Union was thus able to build
on a policy of state intervention to increase yields and improve agricultural technology.
In 1929, a serious shift occurred in this relation. Now emphasis was placed principally on
measures of state compulsion for pressing ahead with agrarian modernisation instead of
offering  incentives  and  credits  to  spur  change.  The  state  issued  directives  without
desiring any longer  to  bear  the costs  for  creating the material  prerequisites  for  the
realisation of those orders. It neither provided the required investment funding under
Stalin nor did it pay the agrarian enterprises the producer prices required to cover costs
of  production—money  with  which  the  enterprises  might  have  been  better  able  to
remunerate their workers and generate funds for further investment. Rather, the party
demanded “tribute” from the peasant farmers for industrialisation. In Stalin’s eyes, they
scarcely  differed  from class  enemies.  It  was  not  until  Brezhnev’s  era  that  the  state
commenced  with  its  crucially  necessary  material  support  for  increasing  yields  per
hectare and bettering animal performance.
54 From 1929 on, in a paternalising manner, the Soviet state decided over the heads of the
agricultural producers in every respect. In so doing, it stripped them of the latitude to
decide  for  themselves  about  the  improvements  in  cultivation  technology  deemed
necessary. The state was unconcerned here about the consistency of its directives from
on high.  Consequently,  it  insisted on a substantial proportion of  the cultivation area
devoted to grain, even though the transition to scientifically grounded crop rotations
necessarily had to actually diminish the area for grain cultivation. The kolkhozes did not
achieve  any  independence  as  enterprises  nor  did  they  attain  any  degree  of
self‑responsibility. The loss of their own tractive power due to the demise of the work
horses brought about by state decree rendered them totally dependent in field work
operations on the farming technology of the machine‑tractor stations (MTS). They thus
lost control over the time scheduling and quality of their work in the fields; in addition,
the  effectiveness  of  that  work  declined.  A  rapid  increase  in  yields  would  have
presupposed  autonomous  agricultural  enterprises  that,  working  under  the  local
conditions,  could  decide  themselves  about  the  optimal  use  of  improved  agricultural
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technology and crop rotations. Moreover, in 1929, the decisive bond between wages and
quality  of  work  performance  was  ruptured  and  lost.  The  agents  of  the  state  often
punished good‑quality work by repeatedly imposing additional burdens on the kolkhozes
that  were  performing  better,  and  did  this  despite  the  extant  prohibition  on  that
introduced in 1932. In effect, the incentive system generally rewarded poor work in the
fields, because the fulfilment of the MTS plan was evaluated according to area, speed of
completion and economising on fuel, but not according to actual yields per hectare on the
fields under cultivation. The kolkhozes were required to make the deliveries of natural
produce in kind to the MTS independent of the quality of the work. Thus, all the informal
institutions of the Soviet command economy in the countryside required violation of the
demands for agricultural technology officially articulated by the party and the state.
55 At the end of the 1920s, there were certainly a notable number of well‑qualified agrarian
experts. In their eyes, the interventions of the state seemed particularly absurd, since
they were able to judge the negative consequences. Since in its official documents, the
state adhered to the goals of improving agricultural technology and the introduction of
crop rotation, the state was dependent on the agronomists. Only those experts were able
to  develop  the  downright  “bacchanalian”  plans  behind  which  the  party  leadership
managed  to  conceal  its  dilettantism  in  the  practical  management  of  agricultural
production. The discrepancy between the optimistic images of the future sketched in the
plans and the realities in the enterprises on the ground could not have been greater. In
the 1930s as well, many experts adhered to their conviction that any improvement in
agricultural technology and the introduction of crop rotations presupposed the active
involvement of the agricultural producers themselves. But to the extent that locally on
the ground they bore the responsibility for implementing agrarian modernisation, they
stood confronting a dilemma. Either they followed their conscience as agrarian experts
and introduced crop rotations, which would have led to a notable increase in yield per
hectare, while concomitantly disregarding and thus violating the state order for a large
area of grain sowing. Or they violated their professional honour in their work on the spot
in order to avoid state measures of repression. Given their deplorable situation, most
appear to have deserted the village.  The party under Stalin misused the agricultural
experts,  branding  them  as  scapegoats  for  the  failure  of  the  “revolutionising  of  the
agricultural  productive  forces” to  materialise.  After  the  poor  harvest  of  1936,  which
exposed Stalin’s promise of a “prosperous” life as a lie and revealed the weaknesses of
“Socialist  agriculture,”  the  party  leadership  chose  in  1937  to  denigrate  the  agrarian
experts before the eyes of the population as “wreckers” and “enemies of the people,” who
intentionally had sabotaged their directives. Many agronomists became victims in 1938 of
the “great terror,” including all the previous People’s Commissars for Agriculture of the
USSR: Iakovlev, Chernov and Eikhe. Just like their more fortunate successor Benediktov,
they all shared, at least in their basic approach, the conviction of the experts: namely that
an increase in per hectare yields presupposed the active participation of the agricultural
producers in the agrarian enterprises.
56 The Soviet project under Stalin resulted in a negative spiral that led to a lasting blockage
of  any  increase  in  yields.  The  major  factor  here  was  that  the  motivation  of  the
agricultural producers was lost, gambled away. Under Stalin the state demanded of the
peasants that they should work seemingly as serfs in the field, performing bonded labour
that  went  largely  unpaid.  An increase in work input in grain and potato cultivation
increased only their own self‑exploitation, but not their income. For the kolkhozes, the
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expansion of  grain  cultivation  entailed  an  increase in  losses  for  the  enterprise.  The
assessment of the radical reformers at the end of the 1980s that the collectivisation had
turned the farmers into agricultural labourers who had lost interest in the results of their
work thus leads to the crux of the problem.121 In Soviet agriculture, there definitely was
no lack of  labour.  The striking lack of  efficient farming technology under the Soviet
command economy has  already  been taken into  due  account  in  this  statement.  The
supposed “felt” lack of labour can be explained by the absence since 1930 of any real
motivation to work. This had a lasting formative impact on Russian economic culture and
has still not been overcome today.
57 In 1939, Benediktov, like the experts of the Organisation Production School before, spoke
once again about the necessity of bringing in the agricultural producers themselves as
active participants, and carrying out agricultural modernisation supported by and relying
on them. Why then was there so little of this in evidence in his own practical actions?
That  probably  can only  be  explained by  the  peculiarities of  political  communication
under  the  dictatorship,  so‑called  “regressive  learning.”122 Benediktov’s  words
contradicted  his  deeds.  Evidently  he  had  been  granted  the  mercy  of  not  having  to
consciously  recognise  that.  A  crop  rotation  from the  bottom up,  determined by  the
enterprises,  excluded the possibility  of  setting exact  figures  in advance for  the total
cultivation  area  of  the  economic  region.  It  was  reserved  to  young  researchers  after
Stalin’s  death,  such  as  the  later  prominent  sociologist  Tatiana  Zaslavskaia,  and  the
agrarian economist Gelii Shmelev, who likewise garnered national recognition in the era
of Perestroika, to state that by their labour, the kolkhozniki evidently extracted value
from the agricultural  products,  because  through their  labour  these  products  became
cheaper!
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ABSTRACTS
This article seeks to explore why the Soviet Union failed to achieve the two aims associated with
the transition to “Socialist agriculture,” namely the industrialization of agricultural production
and  a  rapid  increase  in  agricultural  yields.  In  the  1930s,  the  party  leadership  under  Stalin
launched four large-scale campaigns for the implementation of these aims. These included land
consolidation, the introduction of progressive crop rotation and the use of selected seeds. The
paper describes what informal institutions acted to deter the agricultural producers and those
officials with relevant responsibility in the Soviet party and state bureaucracy from introducing
crop  rotations,  and  why  agricultural  producers  under  Stalin  lost  interest  in  increasing  per
hectare yields. The study reveals the contradiction-ridden character of Stalin’s agrarian policy
and highlights its long-term consequences. 
Cet article étudie les raisons pour lesquelles l’Union soviétique a failli dans la concrétisation de
deux  objectifs  qui  devaient  permettre  la  transition  vers  « l’agriculture  socialiste »,  à  savoir
l’industrialisation de la production agricole et une augmentation rapide des rendements. Dans les
années 1930, la direction du parti sous l’égide de Stalin lança quatre grandes campagnes pour
mener à bien ces objectifs. Cela incluait le remembrement des terres, l’introduction progressive
d’une  rotation  des  cultures  et  l’utilisation  de  semences  sélectionnées.  L’article  décrit  quels
organismes informels entrèrent en action pour dissuader les producteurs agricoles et les officiels
responsables concernés – que ce soit au sein du parti ou dans l’administration –, d’introduire la
rotation  des  cultures  et  pourquoi  les  producteurs  agricoles  d’alors  perdirent  tout  intérêt  à
augmenter le rendement à l’hectare. L’étude révèle le caractère hautement contradictoire de la
politique agricole de Stalin et souligne ses conséquences à long terme. 
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